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* Frank L. Maraist & Wex S. Malone Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center of 
Louisiana State University.  I am self-conscious about this footnote because Charlie 
Sullivan wrote a delightful piece, Charles A. Sullivan, The Under-Theorized Asterisk 
Footnote, 93 GEO. L.J. 1093 (2005).  This footnote is where I often have indicated that 
Charlie, Mike Zimmer, Rebecca White, Steve Willborn, Sandra Sperino, Mike Selmi, and a 
few others reviewed an earlier draft of my Essay.  I asked them to review drafts because I 
trusted them to identify errors and suggest ways in which I could improve the piece.  Now, 
after reading Charlie’s study of the asterisk footnote, I must ask myself if I also did it to 
have “star” names that would attract the attention of law review editors.  Id. at 1116.  I 
probably did.  Alas, Charlie and my other friends did not review a draft of this Essay, and 
that is why it may include errors.  I, however, thank my research assistant, Taylor Ashworth, 
LSU Law Class of 2020, for improving the paper.  I also thank Kristyn A. Couvillion, LSU 
Class of 2021, for helpful and inspiring discussions about her law review comment that 
informed this Essay.  
 1  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act III, sc. 4. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION:  A GUIDE IN EXPLORATIONS OF THE UNIVERSE OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
A. What the Deplanetization2 of Pluto Can Teach Us About 
Employment Discrimination Law 
I always have been fascinated with astronomy.  I grew up, as most 
people alive today, believing that our solar system, the Milky Way, is 
comprised of nine planets, and I memorized and learned about those 
planets.  Pluto, discovered in 1930 and classified as a planet, was probably 
my favorite.  I am not sure why—perhaps because it was farthest from the 
sun or because it was the smallest.  In 2006, the galaxy, and with it my 
childhood beliefs, changed forever.  In terms of planets, the solar system 
shrank.  On August 24, 2006, astronomers in the International 
Astronomical Union (IAU) voted to strip tiny Pluto of its status as a planet 
and reclassify it as a dwarf planet.3  The vote also established three 
categories of objects in our solar system:  planets, dwarf planets, and small 
solar system bodies.4  The vote of the astronomers was controversial.5  The 
debate over classification of Pluto had raged for over a decade.  A 
compromise proposal would have preserved Pluto’s planethood, but it 
would have done so by defining planet so as to bring three more celestial 
objects within the definition.6  The winning proposal, which demoted Pluto, 
was voted on by only 424 astronomers who remained for the last day of the 
conference in Prague.7  One commentator described the decision as a 
victory of scientific reasoning over historical and cultural influences.8 
Astronomer Michael Brown in 2005 had discovered an object larger 
than Pluto and was credited with discovery of a planet.  He lost that honor, 
 
 2  I thought that I was coining this term, and I was proud of my creativity, but I was 
wrong.  See, e.g., Tony Long & Doug Cornelius, Aug. 24, 2006: Pluto Deplanetized, WIRED 
(Aug. 24, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/08/0824pluto-deplanetized/.  I was dismayed 
to learn that “deplanetized” has another meaning in the Urban Dictionary: “Unaware of 
one’s surroundings due to abuse of chemical substances; extremely high.” Captain Tito, 
Deplanetized, URB. DICTIONARY (Apr. 09, 2006), https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.p 
hp?term=deplanetized.  That alternative definition has nothing to do with this Essay.  
 3  See, e.g., Robert Roy Britt, Pluto Demoted: No Longer a Planet in Highly 
Controversial Definition, SPACE.COM (Aug. 24, 2006), https://www.space.com/2791-pluto-
demoted-longer-planet-highly-controversial-definition.html; see also Shankar Vedantam, 
For Pluto, a Smaller World After All, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/24/AR2006082400109.html. 
 4  Britt, supra note 3.  
 5  Id.  
 6  Robert Roy Britt, Details Emerge on Plan to Demote Pluto, SPACE.COM (Aug. 19, 
2006), https://www.space.com/2770-details-emerge-plan-demote-pluto.html. 
 7  See Britt, supra note 3. 
 8  See id.  
CORBETT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2020  4:48 PM 
2020] EXPLORATIONS WITH CHARLIE SULLIVAN 1285 
however, as that object, too, was reclassified as a dwarf planet.9  Ironically, 
it was Brown’s discovery of a celestial body larger than Pluto that finally 
doomed Pluto.  The New York Times injected its gravitas into the 
controversy, running an editorial arguing that Pluto should be 
downgraded.10  Brown argued for preserving the planet status of Pluto 
because of “habit—75 years of calling Pluto a planet—should trump any 
scientific definition.”11  Alas, in the end, we lost a planet and the solar 
system as many of us knew it.  The deplanetization of Pluto may have 
something to teach us about the need to revise our map of the universe of 
employment discrimination. 
In one of his recent outstanding articles on employment 
discrimination law,12 Professor Charles A. Sullivan states that the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly described disparate treatment and disparate impact as 
though they comprise the entire universe of discrimination.13  In this Essay, 
I want to probe that statement by Professor Sullivan, who has been one of 
my principal guides in my explorations of the universe of employment 
discrimination.  We can think of our employment discrimination law as a 
map or model of the universe of the discrimination that occurs in the 
workplace (the universe of employment discrimination).  As emotionally 
painful as it was for many of us to lose little Pluto as a planet, modifying 
forever our view of our solar system, we are years beyond the time when 
the Supreme Court and/or Congress14 should reform employment 
discrimination law to better map the many types of discrimination that 
occur in the workplace.  As with the deplanetization of Pluto, this process 
should involve abandoning our traditions, customs, and outdated beliefs in 
favor of a more realistic conception of the phenomenon of employment 
 
 9  See id.  
 10  Too Many Planets Numb the Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2005), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2005/08/02/opinion/too-many-planets-numb-the-mind.html. 
 11  Id.  
 12  Professor Sullivan is a prolific scholar in areas beyond employment discrimination 
law, including being the historian of the asterisk footnote.  See supra note *.  
 13  Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 403 (2018) [hereinafter 
Sullivan, Employing AI]. 
 14  Congress, of course, enacted the federal employment discrimination laws.  Congress 
also has stepped in to amend the laws several times since their original enactment.  What 
Congress does primarily in the amendments is change the law pronounced in Supreme Court 
decisions with which it disagrees.  Sometimes Congress amends the laws to legislatively 
overturn a single decision, as in the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 
123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).  Congress also has 
enacted amendments that overturn numerous Supreme Court decisions and effect other 
changes, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101 (2018)).  
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discrimination.  Our revised map should follow the science and learning to 
recognize a different, more expansive, and less structured employment 
discrimination law.  This reordering of the model is necessary in order to 
more effectively achieve the objectives of the employment discrimination 
laws—to deter/eradicate invidious discrimination in the workplace and to 
provide compensation to victims of discrimination.15 
Employment discrimination law seems to be vast and complex.  I have 
taught the course for over two decades, and I know that students beginning 
their explorations find it to be confusing.  The analogy between 
employment discrimination law16 and the deplanetization of Pluto is not 
that employment discrimination law is smaller than we thought; rather, it is 
that the actual universe of employment discrimination (the phenomenon or 
occurrence of discrimination in the workplace) is complex and vast, but our 
map of it is inadequate.  It contains too few terms to describe what is out 
there, and the terms we use are a poor fit for the objects in that universe.  
Yet, the Supreme Court tenaciously has clung to what is familiar, 
traditional, and comfortable even as science, learning, and technology have 
undermined its descriptive value. 
 
 
 15  The Court discussed the dual goals of deterrence/eradication of discrimination and 
compensation in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413–25 (1975).  The Court 
identified the “primary objective” of Title VII as “achiev[ing] equality of employment 
opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable 
group of white employees over other employees.”  Id. at 417 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Court then went 
on to recognize that “[i]t is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries 
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.”  Id. at 418.  In her concurring 
opinion in Price Waterhouse, after Justice O’Connor applied the “statutory tort” label to 
Title VII, she noted the two primary functions of Title VII: the deterrence goal related to 
public policy and the compensation or make-whole goal.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 264–65 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  The Third Circuit eloquently 
expressed the preeminence of the public policy: 
[A]n act of employment discrimination is much more than an ordinary font of 
tort law.  The anti-employment discrimination laws are suffused with a 
public aura for reasons that are well known . . . .  A plaintiff in an 
employment-discrimination case accordingly acts not only to vindicate his or 
her personal interests in being made whole, but also as a “private attorney 
general” to enforce the paramount public interest in eradicating invidious 
discrimination. 
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 
1034 (1995).  
 16  The distinction between “employment discrimination law” and the phenomenon of 
“employment discrimination” is crucial to my thesis. 
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B. Charlie Sullivan:  One of My Guides in Explorations of the 
Universe of Employment Discrimination 
For decades Charlie Sullivan has explored the universe of 
employment discrimination and our inadequate modeling of it in 
employment discrimination law.  He has insightfully identified the 
mistakes that the Supreme Court has made in trying to describe that 
universe with theories that are both too limited and inaccurate in their 
description of the composition of the universe.  The limitations and 
inaccuracies of the current model seem destined to become starker with the 
emergence of new technology. 
I began writing about employment discrimination law in 1994.  I met 
the late, great Professor Mike Zimmer and Professor Deborah Calloway at 
a conference at Stetson Law School in 1995.  From that conference came 
my first article on employment discrimination law.17  As a result of that 
publication I met then-Professor and later Dean Rebecca White.  When I 
taught the course Employment Discrimination for the first time in 1996, I 
used the casebook Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination, 
which, over the years, has been the work of various combinations of Mike 
Zimmer, Charlie Sullivan, Rebecca White, and Deborah Calloway.  Not 
long after teaching the course, I corresponded with Professor Charlie 
Sullivan, and I met him at a conference years later. 
I felt very privileged to be invited by Charlie to participate in this 
conference and symposium issue honoring him and his scholarship.  As I 
thought about my subject, I wanted both to pay homage to Charlie’s 
scholarship and to say something meaningful about employment 
discrimination law.  My first thought was that I once again would lambaste 
the pretext framework developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green18 to evaluate disparate treatment claims.  I have 
done that for much of my career, with Charlie’s help and guidance.  For 
this conference, however, I wanted to do something different.  I thought of 
a draft Charlie recently sent me in which he explored why the “motivating 
factor” standard of causation under the mixed-motives analysis has not 
radically changed Title VII discrimination law to produce more victories 
for plaintiffs:  Making Too Much of Too Little?:  Why “Motivating Factor” 
Liability Did Not Revolutionize Title VII.19  That paper is a culmination, to 
 
 17  See William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the 
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at 
Will:  Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 375 (1996).   
 18  411 U.S. 792, 792 (1973). 
 19  Charles A. Sullivan, Making Too Much of Too Little?:  Why “Motivating Factor” 
Liability Did Not Revolutionize Title VII  (Seton Hall Pub. L. Res. Paper, forthcoming), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3431063 [hereinafter Sullivan, Making Too Much]. 
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date, of scholarship that Charlie began about thirty years ago,20 when he 
wrote about the mixed-motives framework and the standards of causation 
articulated by the Court in 1989 in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.21  I 
thought that I would examine standards of causation under the pretext 
framework, to which the great Mike Zimmer and I devoted much of our 
scholarship, and under the mixed-motives analysis, on which Charlie 
focused some of his scholarship.  As I considered this possible topic, a law 
review student whom I am advising this semester visited with me and 
discussed her proposed topic—employment discrimination law as applied 
to the use of artificial intelligence to make employment decisions.  I then 
began thinking about how inadequate the theories of discrimination and the 
proof frameworks in employment discrimination law will be to address the 
issues raised by such new technologies.  This is not a new problem, 
however, as much scholarship has demonstrated that the theories and 
frameworks have been shown to be inaccurate depictions of how 
employment discrimination actually occurs.  Many scholars have written 
about implicit bias and unconscious discrimination.22  Professor Linda 
Hamilton Krieger’s groundbreaking article used social cognition theory to 
demonstrate how poorly our law, which focuses on intent, motive, and 
causation, depicts the actual occurrence of discrimination.23  Artificial 
intelligence and other emerging technologies will only exacerbate the 
problem. 
As I turned to Charlie’s scholarship, I found that, as usual, Charlie had 
gone before me in exploring this sector of the universe of employment 
discrimination, writing an insightful and provocative article on the topic:  
Employing AI.24 
In Employing AI, Charlie wrote that the Supreme Court “has 
repeatedly described [disparate treatment and disparate impact] as if they 
 
 20  Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse:  Proving Disparate 
Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107 (1991) [hereinafter Sullivan, 
Accounting]. 
 21  490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 22  See, e.g., TRISTIN K. GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2017); Samuel Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2006); Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless 
Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1061–62 (2017); Susan Sturm, Second 
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 
484–89 (2001). 
 23  Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1187 (1995). 
 24  Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 13, at 403. 
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comprise the entire universe of ‘discrimination.’”25  Moreover, in that 
article he questioned whether the time-honored dichotomy of theories of 
discrimination will be adequate to address the challenges emerging now, 
stating in his conclusion that “the Supreme Court’s bifurcation of all 
discrimination into two theories, is very problematic, at least unless the 
theories are radically revised.”26 
It is not easy to navigate the universe of employment discrimination 
or the model of it that we have developed in our employment 
discrimination law.  I am grateful to have had more knowledgeable, 
experienced, and wise guides like Charlie, Mike, and Rebecca to keep me 
largely on course in my exploration.  I relied on their casebook to help me 
learn the law.  I sent them drafts of my articles, and they have helped me 
stay on course as best they could.  Without them, I often would have been 
lost in that universe, and the explorations would not have been as enjoyable 
without such companions. 
In Section II, I describe in brief the current map of the universe of 
employment discrimination.  In Section III, I discuss three explorations of 
that universe that Charlie and I have undertaken together: proof structures 
and causation standards; influences of tort law on employment 
discrimination law; and the inadequacy of the employment discrimination 
theories to address the phenomenon of employment discrimination.  In 
Section IV, I explore how the Supreme Court and Congress should 
deplanetize Pluto.  I conclude, and I think Charlie agrees, that, as difficult 
and disconcerting as it may be to relinquish the narrow view of the familiar 
discrimination theories, Congress and the Supreme Court need to reform 
their maps of the universe.  Science and knowledge must prevail over 
custom and history in order to achieve the grand and noble purposes of the 
employment discrimination laws. 
II. THE CURRENT MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 
The employment discrimination map or model developed by the 
Supreme Court is based on dichotomies.27  There are two theories of 
discrimination, and they are distinct.  According to the Supreme Court, this 
dichotomy of theories comprises the entire universe of employment 
discrimination.28  These two theories are said to emanate from two 
 
 25  Id. 
 26  Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 13, at 428. 
 27  See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Breaking Dichotomies at the Core of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 764 (2018).  
 28  See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); 
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015); Sullivan, Employing AI, 
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subsections of Title VII29—disparate treatment from §703(a)(1)30 and 
disparate impact from § 703(a)(2).31  Disparate treatment is discrimination 
that requires proof of motive,32 although intent often is substituted, and the 
two terms are treated as interchangeable.33  Disparate impact, in contrast, is 
defined as unintentional discrimination in which liability is based on a 
disparate impact produced by a facially neutral test, criterion, or other 
practice that cannot be justified by business necessity.34 
Beneath the two theories are proof frameworks used by litigants to 
prove claims of discrimination and used by the courts to analyze the 
litigants’ claims.  Under individual disparate treatment, the Supreme Court 
developed two proof structures for proving and analyzing intentional 
discrimination: the pretext framework first announced in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green35 and the mixed-motives framework articulated by 
the Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,36 which was revised and 
codified by Congress, at least for Title VII,37 in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.38  The Court set forth the disparate impact theory and a rough version 
of the affiliated proof framework in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.39  Congress 
 
supra note 13, at 403; Sandra F. Sperino, Justice Kennedy’s Big New Idea, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
1789, 1794 (2016).   
 29  See Texas Dept. Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2516–17 (2015). 
 30  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). 
 31  Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 32  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.  
 33  See, e.g., Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 13, at 405. 
 34  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.   
 35  411 U.S. 792, 805–06 (1973). 
 36  490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989). 
 37  The Court explained that the mixed-motives framework does not apply under the 
ADEA in Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).  The Court later 
held that mixed motives is not applicable under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII in 
University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).  It 
probably does not apply under the ADA, but the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, 
and there is a split of authority on the issue.  Compare Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. 
Co., Inc., 816 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2016) (joining the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in 
applying but-for causation), and Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 
(6th Cir. 2012) (holding mixed-motives analysis is not applicable to the ADA based on 
Gross) and Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 963–64 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(same), with Hoffman v. Baylor Health Care Sys., 597 F. App’x 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(stating that standard of causation under the ADA is “motivating factor”), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 45 (2015), and Siring v. Or. St. Bd. of Higher Educ., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (D. 
Or. 2013) (same).  
 38  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075–76 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  The two parts of the mixed-motives analysis 
are at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018) (“motivating factor”) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) (same-decision defense). 
 39  401 U.S. 424, 431–432. 
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revised and codified that disparate impact framework for Title VII, but not 
the ADEA and the ADA, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.40 
Disparate treatment was described by the Court early on as “the most 
easily understood type of discrimination” because an employer engages in 
unequal treatment of employees based on a protected characteristic.41  But 
exploring the galaxy of disparate treatment is by no means easy, and the 
Court has made it increasingly difficult as it has developed the theory.  The 
most difficult part of the exploration has been the two proof frameworks—
pretext and mixed-motives.  It was once thought that the pretext analysis 
applied to disparate treatment claims involving circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory intent, and the mixed-motives analysis applied to cases 
involving direct evidence of discrimination.42  That dichotomy was based 
on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse.43  In Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, however, the Supreme Court abrogated that 
distinction.44  The Court held that a plaintiff asserting a Title VII individual 
disparate treatment claim is not required to present direct evidence of 
discrimination in order to be entitled to a “motivating factor”45 jury 
instruction.46  The Court reasoned in Desert Palace that when Congress 
codified a modified version of mixed motives in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 in §§ 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B), Congress said nothing of direct 
evidence.47  The Desert Palace decision raised the question of whether the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework survived the decision.48  If it did, 
 
 40  The framework is at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).  The Supreme Court explained that the 
statutory version of the disparate impact framework does not apply to the ADEA in Smith v. 
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005). 
 41  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
 42  See generally Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse 
Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 878–82 
(2004); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, 
Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1910 (2004) [hereinafter Zimmer, The 
New Discrimination Law].  
 43  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270–71 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 44  Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003). 
 45  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 46  Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 101–02. 
 47  Id. at 98–99. 
 48  See, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990–93 (D. Minn. 
2003); Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: From 
Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J. 559, 566 
(2017); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decision Making and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 741, 765–66 (2005); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating 
Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102–03 
(2004); Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1929–32; Jeffrey A. Van 
Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell 
Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa 
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what was the new line of demarcation between the two frameworks?  
Courts of appeal, however, have misunderstood or ignored the Desert 
Palace holding, reverting to the circumstantial evidence/direct evidence 
dividing line.49  Ignoring Supreme Court precedent would seem to be a 
problem, but perhaps not when the Supreme Court itself ignores its own 
precedent.  In Young v United Parcel Service, Inc., the Court majority 
seemingly followed the lead of lower courts and forgot or ignored the 
holding of Desert Palace, declaring that “a plaintiff can prove disparate 
treatment either (1) by direct evidence that a workplace policy, practice, or 
decision relies expressly on a protected characteristic, or (2) by using the 
burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas.”50 
In recent years, we have learned that the Court’s model of the 
universe of employment discrimination lacks symmetry.  The Supreme 
Court in the past decade has declared that the mixed-motives proof 
structure, which applies to the discrimination provision in Title VII, does 
not apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,51 or the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII.52  The asymmetry gives our model of the 
universe of employment discrimination the appearance of being chaotic.  
This asymmetrical model is the product of Congress providing a model of 
the universe and the Supreme Court interpreting the model, with little 
assurance that the Court understands the vision of Congress or that 
Congress comprehends in depth the doctrine of the Court on which 
Congress relies in amending the statutes.53 
III.  EXPLORATIONS WITH CHARLIE SULLIVAN 
I have followed Charlie in explorations into three areas of 
employment discrimination law: the proof frameworks/causation standards; 
the influence of tort law on employment discrimination law; and the 
inadequacy of the theories of discrimination. 
Mike Zimmer, Charlie, and I each wrote several articles about the 
proof frameworks and their associated standards of causation.  One cannot 
write about the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework without also writing 
about the Price Waterhouse/Civil Rights Act of 199154 mixed-motives 
 
into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 76 (2003). 
 49  See, e.g., Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473, 475 
(5th Cir. 2015); Marable v. Marion Military Inst., 595 F. App’x. 921 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 50  575 U.S. 206, 212–13 (2015). 
 51  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs, 557 U.S. 167, 173 (2009). 
 52  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). 
 53  See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The Curious Incident of Gross and the Significance of 
Congress’s Failure to Bark, 90 TEX. L. REV. 157, 157–158 (2012).   
 54  The mixed-motives analysis was adopted by the Court from constitutional law in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1989), and was modified and codified 
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framework.  Yet, Mike and I wrote primarily about McDonnell Douglas.  
Charlie explored principally the mixed-motives analysis, beginning with 
his 1991 article, Accounting for Price Waterhouse, and culminating with 
his recent article on the “motivating factor” standard of causation, Making 
Too Much of Too Little?: Why “Motivating Factor” Liability Did Not 
Revolutionize Title VII.55 
Charlie wrote and published Accounting for Price Waterhouse in the 
period between the Court’s articulation of the mixed-motives analysis in 
Price Waterhouse and Congress’s codification of a modified version in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.  Charlie compared the pretext and mixed-motives 
frameworks and made several insightful observations that presaged the 
rather chaotic future ahead for the frameworks.  First, both require bad 
(discriminatory) thoughts and causation.56  He pointed out that causation 
“takes center stage in direct evidence decisions,” but in the pretext analysis 
causation is subsumed in the inference drawn from the prima facie case.57  
That is why the Supreme Court never ascribed the but-for causation 
standard to the pretext analysis, but the appellate courts later would retrofit 
it with that standard.58  Second, Charlie recognized that all intentional 
discrimination cases could be characterized as posing the pretext issue, and 
they also could be characterized as raising the mixed-motives issue.59  
From a commonsense perspective, all discrimination cases are likely to be 
mixed motives, as good and bad motives are likely to exist in all adverse 
employment decisions.60  Although there are many prescient insights in the 
article, the final one that I want to emphasize is Charlie’s concluding point 
that the two proof frameworks need not be rejected, but courts should be 
mindful that they are “highly imperfect” tools and take care that the goals 
of Title VII are paramount in each case.61  In other words, the proof 
frameworks, which were not created in the statutes, are not “the thing 
 
by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
 55  Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 19.  
 56  Sullivan, Accounting, supra note 20, at 1139–57. 
 57  Sullivan, Accounting, supra note 20, at 1118. 
 58   See, e.g., Nicholson v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 830 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 
2016).  But see Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
109, 136–38 (2007) (positing that the McDonnell Douglas analysis, despite widespread 
belief to the contrary, does not prove but-for causation).  Curiously, the Supreme Court has 
expressly declined to decide whether the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to 
disparate treatment claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which 
requires but-for causation.  See, e.g., O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 
U.S. 308, 311 (1996).   
 59  Sullivan, Accounting, supra note 20, at 1162. 
 60  Id.  
 61  Sullivan, Accounting, supra note 20, at 1163. 
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itself,”62 and they should not become the dominant features of employment 
discrimination law.  That warning has not been heeded. 
Mike Zimmer sought to discern in the articulations of Congress and 
the Court a uniform analysis for disparate treatment cases under all of the 
employment discrimination laws.63  It appeared that the uniform analysis 
may be achieved when the Supreme Court in 2003 decided Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa.64  Mike discussed this prospect in one of his finest articles.65  
Many of us wrote that Desert Palace rendered the McDonnell Douglas 
pretext analysis unsustainable and meant that all disparate treatment cases 
would be evaluated under some version of the mixed-motives analysis,66 as 
Charlie had suggested in 1991.  We were sorely mistaken.  In the years that 
followed, the pretext analysis flourished, and the Court restricted 
application of the mixed-motives analysis in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc.,67 and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. 
Nassar.68 
Before turning to Charlie’s recent article on the motivating factor 
standard, which rounds out his work on proof frameworks in a brilliant 
thirty-year retrospective, I will consider a related joint exploration of ours.  
At least from Price Waterhouse forward, there have been both suggestions 
by the Supreme Court that employment discrimination claims are statutory 
torts, and the Court has imported tort law terms and concepts into 
employment discrimination doctrine.  Indeed, much of the discussion in 
Price Waterhouse is about standards of causation, two of which are derived 
from tort law—but-for and substantial factor.  I will say more about the 
Price Waterhouse causation standards below.  In 2011, the Supreme Court 
expressly labeled an employment discrimination statute (USERRA)69 a 
statutory tort and imported the concept of proximate cause into 
employment discrimination law in its decision in Staub v. Proctor 
 
 62  See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1 (quoting from Shakespeare’s King Lear). 
 63  Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment 
Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563 (1996).  Zimmer would further develop this 
vision and examine progress by the courts in Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: 
Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693 
(2000). 
 64  539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 65  Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1887.  
 66  See, e.g., Kaitlin Picco, The Mixed-Motive Mess: Defining and Applying a Mixed 
Motive Framework, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 461 (2011); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The 
Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. 
REV. 83 (2004); Van Detta, supra note 48, at 76.  
 67  557 U.S. 167 (2009).  
 68  570 U.S. 338 (2013).  
 69  The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 
4301–4334. 
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Hospital.70  That decision provoked scholarly exploration of the influence 
of tort law on employment discrimination, and Charlie led that exploration 
in an article in which he cautioned that the importation of proximate cause 
in Staub could be a way of narrowing employment discrimination law so 
that it does not apply to cognitive bias and unconscious discrimination.71  
Another outstanding scholar, Sandra Sperino, followed Charlie in that 
exploration.72  Many scholars then joined in a conference and symposium 
issue.73  Charlie wrote an article for the symposium in which he explained 
that tortification of employment discrimination is not inherently bad, but 
the Court is doing it badly.74 
The exploration of tortification of employment discrimination law 
circles back to the exploration of proof framework/standards of causation.  
In Making Too Much of Too Little, Charlie explains why the motivating 
factor standard of causation has not revolutionized our legal model of 
employment discrimination.  In the end, he describes “motivating factor” as 
“a noble failure.”75  Of course, because of the Court’s decisions in Gross 
and Nassar, any revolution probably would have been confined to the 
discrimination provision of Title VII.76  The motivating factor standard of 
causation, which is the focus of the plaintiff’s prima facie case in the 
mixed-motives analysis, has not been used by plaintiffs as much as we 
anticipated it would be, and it has not resulted in a spate of plaintiffs’ 
victories.77  Here, it is important to trace the origins of the standard and its 
development.  Charlie does this in detail in his article, but I will provide a 
short version here.  Motivating factor was the standard adopted by the 
 
 70  562 U.S. 411 (2011). 
 71  Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1431 
(2012).   
 72  See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and 
Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 73  See Martha Chamallas & Sandra F. Sperino, Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration 
and Conflict: Symposium Introduction, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1021 (2014).   
 74  Charles A. Sullivan, Is There a Madness to the Method?  Torts and Other Influences 
on Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079 (2014). 
 75  Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 19, at 37. 
 76  Whether the holdings of Gross and Nassar would be extended to the Americans 
With Disabilities Act and thus preclude application of motivating factor and mixed-motives 
analysis is uncertain.  Compare Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 
234 (4th Cir. 2016) (joining the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in applying but-for causation), 
and Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding 
mixed-motives analysis is not applicable to the ADA based on Gross), and Serwatka v. 
Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 963–64 (7th Cir. 2010) (same), with Hoffman v. 
Baylor Health Care Sys., 597 F. App’x 231, 235 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that standard of 
causation under the ADA is “motivating factor”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 45 (2015), and 
Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ. 977 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (D. Or. 2013) (same).  
 77  Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 19.  
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plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse.  The plurality took the mixed-
motives framework and the motivating factor standard of causation from 
the Court’s analysis of First Amendment claims in Mt. Healthy City Board 
of Education v. Doyle.78  That Mt. Healthy opinion used the term 
“motivating factor” but also used “substantial factor” and used them as 
though they were interchangeable.79  Justice O’Connor in her concurrence, 
however, did not regard them as interchangeable.  She selected “substantial 
factor” as the standard for the plaintiff’s prima facie case that would trigger 
a shift in the burden of persuasion.  She considered “motivating factor” too 
lenient to justify shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant on the 
issue of the same-decision defense.80 
When Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, selected “motivating 
factor” and inserted it in the discrimination provision of Title VII, there 
was reason to believe that plaintiffs would be much more successful on 
Title VII claims.  Congress selected from the Price Waterhouse opinions 
what was seemingly the lower or less stringent standard of causation.  The 
language originally included in the bill was “contributing” factor, but it was 
changed to “motivating factor,” which the House Report described as 
“cosmetic” and stated that it “w[ould] not materially change the courts’ 
findings.”81 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress relaxed the 
but-for causation standard embodied in the language “because of.”82  Yet, 
as Charlie observes, it does not appear that “motivating factor” has resulted 
in heavy reliance on mixed-motives analysis by plaintiffs or yielded 
significantly more plaintiff successes.83  Charlie posits several reasons for 
this nonoccurrence:  (1) “motivating factor” is too hard (or unfamiliar) a 
concept for judges and lawyers; (2) “motivating factor” is not too hard to 
understand, but too radical; and (3) plaintiffs opt out of urging its 
application because it invokes the stage two same-decision limitation of 
 
 78  429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 79  “Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show that 
his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ –
or to put it in other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor.’”  Id. at 287.  The case cited by 
the Mt. Healthy Court used the term “motivating factor.”  Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Develop. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977). 
 80  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261 (“My disagreement stems from the 
plurality’s conclusions concerning the substantive requirement of causation under the 
statute . . . .”). 
 81  Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1946 (quoting 137 Cong. 
Rec. H3944-45 (daily ed. June 5, 1991)). 
 82  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015); Univ. of 
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2013).  
 83  Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 19, at 22. 
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remedies.84 
I have some reservations about saying that “motivating factor” is an 
abject failure.  I think plaintiffs do survive some motions for summary 
judgment which they may have lost under the pretext analysis by arguing 
that all they must prove to defeat summary judgment is that discrimination 
was a “motivating factor” in the adverse employment actions.  Admittedly, 
the foregoing proposition would be hard to prove.  Yet, I, like Charlie, was 
a “fan” of the motivating factor causation standard that Congress enacted in 
1991.  Indeed, Mike Zimmer and I argued that Desert Palace rendered all 
disparate treatment cases subject to the motivating factor standard in the 
mixed-motives analysis.85  Mike argued that the McDonnell Douglas 
framework remained viable, but had very limited application.86  I went 
further and argued that, without a line of demarcation between the two 
proof structures, such as direct evidence before Desert Palace, the pretext 
framework was no longer viable.87  Mike lauded the potential of the 
statutory mixed-motives analysis: 
Under the approach adopted in § 703(m), all of these different 
types of evidence can help form the basis for a reasonable 
factfinder to draw the inference of discrimination under the “a 
motivating factor” standard for establishing liability. Looking at 
the litigation of individual discrimination cases from the 
viewpoint of a court determining a motion for summary 
judgment, the correct approach under § 703(m) closely 
resembles the approach used in general litigation.88 
Charlie now regards “motivating factor” as a noble failure.  He has 
persuaded me that Congress’s codification of this relaxed standard of 
causation was a mistake, but perhaps for different reasons.  First, the 
standard, in retrospect, was destined to fail.  The Supreme Court, even 
before Price Waterhouse, regarded the employment discrimination statutes 
as statutory torts.  In her Price Waterhouse concurrence, Justice O’Connor 
discussed tort causation standards and the underlying tort case law.89  
“Motivating factor” is not a tort causation standard, and the Supreme Court 
 
 84  See Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 19, at 23, 26, 34.  
 85  See Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1943 (stating that 
“litigating individual discrimination cases using § 703(m) is feasible for all Title VII 
individual discrimination cases”). 
 86  Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1940. 
 87  See generally William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 1549 (2005). 
 88  Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1937–38.  
 89  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264–65 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (citing Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 84–87 (1948); Kingston v. Chicago & 
N.W.R. Co., 191 Wis. 610, 616 (1927); 2 J. WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 153 (1912)).  
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prefers to import tort principles into employment discrimination law.90  
More significantly, however, “motivating factor” anchors the mixed-
motives proof framework in the discredited idea that discriminators 
typically are motivated by discriminatory impulses, suggesting that they are 
aware of them—that they have a conscious intent to discriminate.  This is 
how the plurality explained “motivating factor” in Price Waterhouse.91  
The work of Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger and many scholars who 
followed her has undermined the idea that most discrimination is the 
product of conscious motivation.92  Even if we applaud Congress for 
attempting to lower the standard of causation in the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case, we should be reluctant to embrace a standard of causation that adopts 
the discredited motivation-based model of the universe of employment 
discrimination. 
Finally, explorations with Charlie of proof structures and affiliated 
causation standards lead me to the most overarching exploration in which I 
have followed him: the Court’s inaccurate and harmfully narrow model of 
the universe of employment discrimination.  There are two and only two 
theories: disparate treatment and disparate impact, and never the two shall 
meet.93  First, this seems like an unnecessarily restrictive model of the 
universe that the Court already has recognized.  Why are non-
accommodation, harassment, and stereotyping not co-equal theories (or 
planets)?  Professors David Oppenheimer and Stephanie Bornstein have 
argued that the Court already has recognized theories of discrimination 
beyond treatment and impact.94  They further argue that it should recognize 
broader theories, with Oppenheimer arguing for recognition of negligent 
discrimination, and Bornstein for reckless discrimination.  I, too, have 
argued that forcing all discrimination cases into a disparate treatment or 
disparate impact theory with associated proof frameworks does not 
accurately depict either the actual universe of discrimination or the model 
that the Court has developed to date.95 
The research on cognitive and implicit bias suggests that the Court’s 
limited model of the discrimination universe never has been accurate.  
 
 90  Cf. Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed-
Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 19 (1991) 
(discussing the nuances of mixed-motives cases and criticizing the focus on causation and 
positing that “the concept of such ‘factors’ is one that has not been, and cannot be, given 
any coherent sense”). 
 91  Id. at 63. 
 92  See supra note 23. 
 93  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). 
 94  See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 899, 967–72 (1993); Bornstein, supra note 22, at 1103–07. 
 95  See Corbett, Breaking Dichotomies, supra note 27, at 807. 
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Charlie’s article Employing AI demonstrates that this disconnect is likely to 
be exacerbated by the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) to make 
employment decisions.  To begin with, a disparate treatment theory 
requiring proof of a motivating factor seems ill-suited to AI, which lacks 
motivation.  Although disparate impact will capture some cases of 
discrimination resulting from data mining and algorithms,96 Charlie, 
Pauline Kim,97 Stephanie Bornstein,98 and others have demonstrated that 
the current model of disparate impact will not address many of these cases.  
Charlie concludes Employing AI by stating that “[o]ne critical lesson is that 
the Supreme Court’s bifurcation of all discrimination into two theories, is 
very problematic, at least unless the theories are radically revised.”99 
I have followed Charlie into several parts of the universe of 
employment discrimination.  With his help and guidance, I have tried to 
make sense of the Court’s model, consisting of two theories.  Charlie also 
took me along for an exploration of the dichotomy of proof frameworks 
and the associated causation standards.  Related to this, he led me to 
explore the tortification of employment discrimination law and helped me 
understand that the importation of tort principles was not necessarily or 
inherently detrimental to the model. 
As we face the rapid proliferation of use of AI in making employment 
decisions, the Court’s model of the universe of employment discrimination 
seems increasingly inadequate.  We are long past the time when the Court 
and Congress should be willing to realize that disparate treatment and 
disparate impact may not be planets, or if their classification as such is to 
be preserved, then they should develop a view that permits recognition of 
many more.  As fond as I was of Pluto, it had to be deplanetized or new 
planets had to be recognized.  Either approach would change forever our 
familiar and comfortable model.  As complacent as we may have grown 
with the theories, proof structures, and causation standards, they 
increasingly do not provide an accurate description of the universe of 
employment discrimination. 
IV.  THEORIZING A NEW MODEL 
The new model that I have in mind does not jettison all of the 
concepts that have comprised the old one.  A larger and less restricted 
 
 96  Pauline Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 
890–91 (2017); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 701–12 (2016). 
 97  Kim, supra note 96, at 890.  
 98  Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 567 
(2018). 
 99  Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 13, at 428. 
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model, however, could be built not on the old planets, but by going back to 
the statutory language “because of . . .”  The Court has limited that 
terminology in Gross and Nassar to mean a but-for causation standard, but 
that was not an obvious or necessary decision.  Congress and the Court 
always have treated the theories, proof frameworks, and causation 
standards as the foundation on which the model is based.  None of that, 
however, is statutory.  In Employing A1, Charlie recommended an approach 
that emanates from the statutory language: 
However, there’s a more direct and more textual way to reach 
the same result without treating Arti [an AI program] as human, 
although that requires abandoning the Court’s bifurcated 
structure and returning to the text of the statute.  The governing 
language of Title VII (and other antidiscrimination laws) clearly 
proscribes Arti’s use of gender as a selection criterion, and does 
so entirely without the need for either of the two theories 
articulated by the Court over the years.  The core prohibition of 
Title VII is § 703, whose two subsections have been viewed as 
the basis, respectively, of disparate treatment and disparate 
impact liability.  But, entirely apart from the judicial gloss of 
each subsection, the language of the statute would declare Arti’s 
gender-explicit criterion a violation under both prongs.100 
Other scholars have recommended that distinct and rigid theories and 
proof structures are not necessary to prove and analyze employment 
discrimination claims.  In recommending the rejection of the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext structure after the Supreme Court decided St. Mary’s 
Honor Center v. Hicks,101 Professor Deborah Malamud argued that 
maintaining these special rules for discrimination cases is harmful because 
it creates the false impression that there are preferential rules for plaintiffs, 
when in fact the “rules” do not function that way.102  She concluded that it 
may be better to let the “cold winds of litigation blow.”103  In a similar 
vein, Mike Zimmer thought that a principal advantage of the mixed-
motives framework was that all evidence could be presented under the 
“motivating factor” standard rather than being forced into one of the three 
stages of the pretext analysis.104  This open-ended approach, he argued, 
“closely resembles the approach used in general litigation.”105  But as 
Charlie has shown, “motivating factor” has been used little and has been, to 
 
 100  Sullivan, Employing AI, supra note 13, at 407.  
 101  509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
 102  Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet:  Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 2229, 2324 (1995). 
 103  Id.  
 104  Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1937–38. 
 105  Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law, supra note 42, at 1938. 
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some extent, a failure.106 
It is not necessary to deplanetize everything that exists in the current 
model in order to create a new model.  There is, however, a danger in 
keeping the familiar model and trying to build a more open one on it.  For 
example, the Seventh Circuit in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.107 
considered its prior effort to develop a less structured approach to proving 
discrimination by saying that a plaintiff can present a “convincing mosaic” 
of evidence of discrimination.  This sounds like the approach for which I 
am advocating.  Lower courts and even the Seventh Circuit itself, however, 
understood this to be a new and additional proof structure, and the court 
had to circle back in Ortiz to explain that it had not intended to create a 
new test of discrimination.108  Maintaining the structures of the current 
model risks creating a new model that remains focused on them. 
Going back to the language of the statues and permitting a plaintiff to 
present the evidence of discrimination without classifying the claim as 
disparate treatment or disparate impact and funneling all evidence into a 
proof framework would be a new and simpler model of employment 
discrimination.  It also might capture the variety of forms of discrimination 
that exist in the universe.  The courts’ and Congress’s tenacious adherence 
to the familiar model will make such a change difficult. 
Realistically, however, I think the Supreme Court and Congress will 
adhere to the familiar concepts.  Indeed, there is now some necessity based 
on current statutory language to classify cases as disparate treatment or 
disparate impact.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 incorporates those concepts 
with meaningful distinction in the statutes in § 1981a, which makes jury 
trials and compensatory and punitive damages available in cases of 
“unlawful intentional discrimination,” (or disparate treatment cases).109  
Still, less insistence by the Court on the current rigid classification scheme 
would improve the model.  Although the Court did not admit to doing so, it 
blended concepts from disparate treatment and disparate impact in Young v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc.110  The Court could expressly recognize other 
theories of discrimination.111  Beneath the level of the theories, there is 
nothing in the statutes that requires that cases be divided into direct and 
circumstantial evidence cases112 and then funneled into proof frameworks.  
 
 106  See supra text accompanying notes 83–84, 89–92. 
 107  834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 108  Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764–65. 
 109  42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1)–(2) (2018). 
 110  575 U.S. 206 (2015).  For discussion of the blending, see generally William R. 
Corbett, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.:  McDonnell Douglas to the Rescue?, 92 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1683 (2015).   
 111  See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. 
 112  See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765–66.  As discussed above, doing this runs afoul of the 
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Some courts have recognized that the pretext framework is not a suitable 
analysis for some cases, and it actually can obscure the real issue in the 
discrimination claim.113 
Although any new map of the universe undoubtedly would retain 
familiar terms, categories, and characterizations, it could be a more fluid 
and diverse model.  The original statutory language will support such a 
map of the universe.  The deplanetization of Pluto should have occurred 
many years ago in employment discrimination law. 
V.  EXPLORING AND THEORIZING WITH CHARLIE 
I do not know what Charlie may think of my latest idea.  He has been 
a kind and helpful guide in our explorations, although he knows I have 
gotten off course more than once.  I am privileged to have a friend, mentor 
and guide like Charlie Sullivan.  Wherever we go from here in developing 
models of the universe of employment discrimination, I feel better knowing 
that Charlie is going before me. 
 
 
Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace.  See supra text accompanying notes 44–50. 
 113  See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328, 1346 n.86 (11th 
Cir. 2011). 
